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Seeking unity in the eu
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| Sana | 01.04.2024 | | Hajmi | 12.98 Kb. | | #183692 |
Bog'liq Economidt 6 130 Valiyev Lochin Azamatovich 832-838, ZDIF1513, Ma\'lumotlar bazasi (Sh.Nazirov, A.Ne\'matov, R.Qobulov, N.Mardonova), KT amaliy ishi 1
Seeking unity in the EU The use of qualified-majority voting (QMV) and the veto in the European Union is complicated (Charlemagne, September 24th). For one thing the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 was a misnomer from the outset. It was not a compromise but an agreement to disagree. France held that a single member state’s assertion of its vital national interest could override a qualified majority; the other five member states said that it could not. So the Luxembourg Compromise could not, can not and will not be turned into a legally binding text.
Moreover, there are fundamental differences in negotiating culture that derive from a treaty providing for QMV and one requiring unanimity. In the case of QMV the risks perceived by individual member states to their interests have to be avoided by a process of negotiation and compromise (often successfully, which is why so few EU decisions actually require a formal vote). Unanimity, on the other hand, encourages intransigence and a refusal to negotiate.
Perhaps the most notable example of circumventing the unanimity requirement was when Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel persuaded their colleagues to find a way round an attempted veto of a fiscal treaty by David Cameron’s government (to extract concessions over singlemarket financialservices legislation). But using this tactic is fraught with many difficulties and limitations, particularly in cases involving new accessions, foreign policy and security and tax. That is why we can expect the EU to continue to struggle over the scope of QMV. Most of the focus is on the use of what is called the passerelle clause in the existing treaty, which allows some limited extension of QMV without the need for treaty ratification by member states. David Hannay House of Lords London
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