An essay in universal history




Download 0,7 Mb.
bet39/43
Sana22.11.2020
Hajmi0,7 Mb.
#12762
1   ...   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43
“However,” writes O.F. Soloviev, “at the very beginning Germany made clear her lack of desire even to consider the central question of disarmament, in spite of the intentions of the other participants. Kaiser Wilhelm II made a sensational speech in Wiesbaden in which he declared that the best guarantee of peace was ‘a sharpened sword’.491 Then, for the sake of consensus, the remaining delegates, at the suggestion of the Frenchman L. Bourgeois (1851-1926), a former president of the council of ministers and a Mason, limited themselves to accepting an evasive formula on the extreme desirability of ‘limiting the military burdens which now weigh on the world for the sake of improving both the material and the moral prosperity of mankind’.
“After this the attention of delegates was concentrated on the third commission, which discussed problems of arbitration under the presidency of the same Bourgeois, with [Jacques] Decan [a member of the Grand Orient of Belgium], as secretary. As a result of these efforts, which were supported by other governments, success was obtained in paralysing the attempts of the Germans completely to exclude the application of arbitration procedures in the regulation of conflicts. In the preambule to the convention on ‘the peaceful resolution of international conflicts’, which was unanimously accepted, it was noted that the conference had been convened on the initiative of ‘the most august monarch’, Nicholas II, whose thoughts it was necessary to strengthen by an agreement on the principles of right and justice, on which ‘the security of states and the prosperity of peoples’ rested. The first article of the first section ‘On the Preservation of Universal Peace’ made the following provision: ‘With the aim of averting, if possible, the turning to force in the mutual relations between states, the signatory powers agree to apply all their efforts to guarantee a peaceful resolution of international disagreements.’… Decan in his report to the commission was apparently the first to use the term ‘League of Nations’ to apply to the union of state approving of similar documents. Later the term was more and more widely used long before the creation, after the First World War, of an international organization of that name.”492
The Tsar’s initiative was a noble one, as the American President Warren Harding officially acknowledged in 1921; and it was not without long-term consequences that are discernible today. Nevertheless, the fact was that there was no way in which the two great opposing ideological forces of Europe – Russian Orthodox Tsarism and Continental Freemasonry – could work together for long. The idea of a League of Nations was essentially a way of limiting the power of sovereign nations, and this could not be in the long-term interests of Russia – or of the world as a whole, insofar as such a League was in essence the embryo of a world government which the Freemasons with their anti-monarchist and anti-Christian ideology would have a much better chance of controlling than Russia. Already in 1899, the tsar found himself having to fend off some undesirable suggestions on arms limitation493, and within six months he had evidently cooled towards the idea of arbitration – he sent large numbers of troops into Manchuria without presenting his dispute with China to the court. Nor did the British think of arbitration before launching their war against the Boers. The fact was, “no European government would accept the idea of arms reduction.”494
It was not only the nationalists that hindered the attempts of tsars and statesmen to stop the arms race and prevent war. Socialist workers also consistently placed national pride above the international solidarity of the working class. Thus the Second International’s numerous attempts to force governments to reduce armaments and stop fighting were undermined by the conflicting nationalisms of French and German workers, Bulgarian and Serb workers, Austrian and Italian and Czech workers.495
Only the Russian socialists appeared to have no difficulty in placing class above nation – perhaps because so many of them were Jews… On the eve of the First World War, the assassination of the great French socialist and internationalist Jean Jaurès symbolised the failure of socialism in the face of nationalism. But when the nationalists had exhausted themselves, the path would be open for the only completely consistent internationalist – because he hated all nations equally – Vladimir Lenin….


1 Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers, New York: Vintage Books, 2002, p. 77.

2 Rimmer, “Lincoln’s Civil War”, All About History, p. 28.

3 Roberts, History of the World, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, p. 620.

4 Davies, Europe: A History, London: Pimlico, 1997, pp. 812, 813.

5 Buchan, in Susan-Mary Grant, "For God and Country: Why Men Joined Up for the US Civil War", History Today, vol. 50 (7), July, 2000, p. 21.

6 David Reynolds, America, Empire of Liberty, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 205

7 James Ostrowski, "An Analysis of President Lincoln's Legal Arguments against Secession". Paper delivered at the academic conference on secession-- "Secession, State, and Economy", April, 1995.

8 Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital (1848-1875), London: Abacus, 1975, pp. 170-173.

9 Roberts, op. cit., pp. 621-622.

10 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 199.

11 Reynolds, op. cit., p. 211.

12 Robertson, "The Christian Soldier: General Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson", History Today, vol. 53 (2), February, 2003, pp. 31-32.

13 Thornton, “Partnering with Putin”, New American, November 20, 2015, http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/21998-partnering-with-putin

14 Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 218, 219-220.

15 Lieven, Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia, London: Allen Lane, 2015, pp. 22-23.

16 Tooze, The Deluge, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 44.

17 Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, London: Allen Lane, 2013, p. 237.

18 Archbishop Averky (Taushev), Rukovodstvo k izucheniu Sviaschennago Pisania Novago Zaveta (Guide to the Study of the Holy Scriptures of the New Testament), Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, vol. II, pp. 354-355.

19 As did the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim II. See http://orthodoxhistory.org/2015/04/27/ecumenical-patriarch-opposes-american-slavery-in-1862.

20 Nikolai Boeikov, “O rossijskoj monarkhii” (On the Russian Monarchy), in Protopriest Benjamin Zhukov (ed.), Nikolaj II, Paris, 2013, p. 15.

21 Sergius and Tamara Fomin, Rossia pered Vtorym Prishestviem (Russia before the Second Coming), Moscow: Rodnik, 1994, vol. I, p. 343.

22 Evans, op. cit., pp. 5-6. As Bismarck said in January, 1862: "The Prussian monarchy has not yet completed its mission; it is not yet ready to become a purely ornamental decoration of your constitutional Parliament; not yet ready to be manipulated as a piece of lifeless machinery of parliamentary government." (Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 674) (V.M.).

23 What Bismarck actually said in his "blood and iron" statement in 1862 was: "Prussia's frontiers as laid down by the Vienna treaties are not conducive to a healthy national life; it is not by means of speeches and majority resolutions that the great issues of the day will be decided - that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by iron and blood" (in Bobbitt, op. cit., p. 186).

24 Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 674.

25 Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, London: Allen Lane, 2013, p. 229.

26 “For heaven’s sake no sentimental alliances in which the consciousness of having performed a good deed furnishes the sole reward for our sacrifice… The only healthy basis of policy for a great power… is egotism and not romanticism… Gratitude and confidence will not bring a single man into the field on our side; only fear will do that, if we use it cautiously and skillfully… Policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative” (in Kissinger, op. cit., p. 76).

27 Winder, Danubia, London: Picador, 2013, p. 1.

28 Biddiss, "Nationalism and the Moulding of Modern Europe", History, 79, N 257, October, 1984, p. 420.

29 Lieven, Empire, London: John Murry, 2000, pp. 160-161.

30 Winder, op. cit., p. 370.

31 Davies, op. cit., p. 829.

32 Lieven, op. cit., p. 180.

33 Spellmann, Monarchies, London: Reaktion Press, 2001, pp. 219-221.

34 Alistair Horne, Seven Ages of Paris, London: Pan Books, 2003, p. 277.

35 Victor Hugo appealed: "It is in Paris that the beating of Europe's heart is felt. Paris is the city of cities. Paris is the city of men. There has been an Athens, there has been a Rome, and now there is Paris... Is the nineteenth century to witness this frightful phenomenon? A nation fallen from polity, to barbarism, abolishing the city of nations; Germans extinguishing Paris... Can you give this spectacle to the world" (Horne, op. cit., p. 287).

36 V. F. Ivanov, Russkaia Intelligentsia i Masonstvo: ot Petra I do nashikh dnej (The Russian Intelligentsia and Masonry: from Peter I to our days), Moscow, 1997, pp. 358-359. (V.M.)

37 Horne, op. cit., p. 282.

38 Price, A Concise History of France, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 189-191.

39 Almond, Revolution, London: De Agostini, 1996, pp. 112-113, 114-115.

40 Thompson, Europe since Napoleon, London: Penguin Books, 1966, p. 395.

41 Tiutchev, in Fomin and Fomina, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 83 -84.

42 Thompson, op. cit., pp. 395-396.

43 Barzun, op. cit., p. 588.

44 Ridley, op. cit., p. 214.

45 Yu.K. Begunov, A.D. Stepanov, K.Yu. Dushenov, Taina Bezzakonia (The Mystery of Iniquity), St. Petersburg, 2002, pp. 387-388.

46 Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich, London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 6-8.

47 Lieven, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

48 Von Treitschke, in Ehrenreich, Blood Rites, London: Virago, 1998, pp. 201-202. Such theories were not confined to Germany. In England, Lord Wolseley saw a "military spirit" as "the purifier of civilisation, its defence against enemies from without and degeneracy from within" (Stuart T. Miller, Mastering Modern European History, London: Palgrave, 1997, p. 195)

49 Evans, op. cit., pp. 8-12.

50 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, London: Penguin, 2002, pp. 203-204.

51 Stürmer, The German Empire 1871-1919, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000, pp. 3-4.

52 Disraeli, in Stürmer, op. cit., p. 2; Bobbitt, op. cit., p. 201.

53 Kissinger, World Order, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 77.

54 Bobbitt, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

55 Bobbitt, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

56 Mann, The History of Germany since 1789, London: Pimlico, p. 233.

57 Mary Greene writes: “By the time his father died of cancer in 1888 at their palace in Potsdam, Wilhelm was set in his anglophobia and loathing for his mother and her liberal ideas. An English doctor had crippled his arm, he declared, and an English doctor had killed his father after misdiagnosing his cancer as benign: ‘One cannot have enough hatred for England’.” (Did Kaiser Bill’s mother spark the Great War?, Weekend, November 16, 2013, p. 9).

58 As Felix Ponsonby said, "He was the creation of the Germans themselves. They wanted a sabre-rattling autocrat with theatrical ways, attempting to dominate Europe, sending telegrams and making bombastic speeches, and he did his best to supply them with the superman they required." (in Miranda Carter, The Three Emperors, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 365). Again, as Stuart Miller writes, "the real problem was that he was too typical of the new state which he was now called upon to rule. A very complex personality with a rather stunted body and a withered arm, he was very insecure and unsure of himself and over-compensated for these inadequacies with bumptious aggressiveness and flamboyant posing. 'Psychological' versions of history can be very dangerous, but it is not difficult to see the problems and responses of the Kaiser and the state as being identical" (Mastering Modern European History, London: Palgrave, 1997, p. 226).

59 Spellman, Monarchies, London: Reaktion Press, 2001, p. 218.

60 Bernard Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, London: Allen Lane, 2013, p. 263.

61 Baigent and Leigh, The Inquisition, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 196.

62 Baigent and Leigh, op. cit., p. 197.

63 Jasper Ridley, The Freemasons, London: Constable, 1999, pp. 208-210.

64 Some of these condemned propositions were: "Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true... In the present day it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship... The Roman pontiff can and should reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization" (Peter de Rosa, Vicars of Christ, London: Bantam books, 1988, pp. 146, 245, 246)

65 Baigent and Leigh, op. cit., p. 205.

66 Bulgakov, The Vatican Council, South Canaan, 1959, p. 62; quoted in Fr. Michael Azkoul, Once Delivered to the Saints, Seattle: St. Nectarios Press, 2000, p. 204.

67 Young, The Rush to Embrace, Richfield Springs, NY: Nikodemos Orthodox Publication Society, 1996, pp. 31-32.

68 De Rosa, op. cit., p. 243.

69 Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, London: Penguin, 2000, pp. 14-15.

70 De Rosa, op. cit., pp. 242-243.

71 Baugent and Leigh, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

72 Popovich, "Reflections on the Infallibility of European Man", in Orthodox Faith and Life in Christ, Belmont, Mass.: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1994, pp. 104-105.

73 Vasilopoulos, O Oikoumenismos khoris maska (Ecumenism unmasked), Athens, 1988, p. 34.

74 Vasileiades, Orthodoxia kai Papismos en dialogo (Orthodoxy and Papism in Dialogue), Athens, 1981, p. 23.

75 "In 1867, with Garibaldi's small force in premature action only fifteen miles from the Vatican, the pope, still defiant, said: 'Yes, I hear them coming.' Pointing to the Crucifix: 'This will be my artillery'" (De Rosa, op. cit., p. 148).

76 Plumb, “The First Vatican Council”, Catholic Life, April, 2010, p. 6.

77 Roger Price writes: "7,350,000 voters registered their approval, 1,538,000 voted 'no', and a further 1,900,000 abstained. To one senior official it represented 'a new baptism of the Napoleonic dynasty'. It had escaped from the threat of political isolation. The liberal empire offered greater political liberty but also order and renewed prosperity. It had considerable appeal. The centres of opposition remained the cities, with 59 per cent of the votes in Paris negative and this rising to over 70 per cent in the predominantly workers arrondissements of the north-east. In comparison with the 1869 elections, however, opposition appeared to be waning. Republicans were bitterly disappointed. Even Gambetta felt bound to admit that 'the empire is stronger than ever'. The only viable prospect seemed to be a long campaign to persuade the middle classes and peasants that the republic did not mean revolution" (A Concise History of France, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 188-189).

78 Lebedev, Velikorossia (Great Russia), St. Petersburg, 1999, pp. 363-364.

79 Duggan, A Concise History of Italy, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 143.

80 "Napoleon, by the grace of God and the national will Emperor of the French".

81 Spellmann, Monarchies, London: Reaktion Press, 2001, p. 214.

82 Zamoyski, Holy Madness, p. 444.

83 Ibid. As was written on his tombstone: O Italia, Quanta Gloria e Quanta Bassezza!

84 Machiavelli, in Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, London: Allen Unwin, 1946, p. 528.

85 Leontiev, "Natsional'naia politika kak orudie vsemirnoj revoliutsii" (National politics as a weapon of universal revolution), Vostok, Rossia i Slavianstvo (The East, Russia and Slavdom), Moscow, 1996, p. 526. Leontiev also wrote: If I were in Rome, I should not hesitate to kiss not only the hand but also the slipper of Leo XIII... Roman Catholicism suits my unabashed taste for despotism, my tendency to spiritual authority, and attracts my heart and mind for many other reasons' (op. cit., p. 529). "An interesting ecumenical remark for an Orthodox," comments Wil van den Bercken (Holy Russia and Christian Europe, London: SCM Press, 1999, p. 213), "but it is not meant that way." That is, he admired the papacy for its authoritarianism without sharing its religious errors.

86 Baigent and Leigh, op. cit., p. 208.

87 Pope Pius X; quoted in Catholique Nationale, July 13, 1895, Paris: Benziger Brothers Publishing.

88 Nietzsche, David Strauss (1873), in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, New York: Random House, 2000, p. 136, footnote.

89 What Nietzsche prized above all in German culture was “an elevation and divinatory subtlety of the historical sense” (Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings, p. 312). (V.M.)

90 Mann, The History of Germany since 1789, London: Pimlico, 1996, pp. 239-240.

91 Mann, op. cit., p. 240.

92 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992, p. 146.

93 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Part I, 13; Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p. 211.

94 Nietzsche admired both Hegel and Schopenhauer, and despised the English philosophers for their absence of an historical sense. As he wrote in Beyond Good and Evil: “They are no philosophical race, these Englishmen: Bacon signifies an attack on the philosophical spirit; Hobbes, Hume, and Locke a debasement and lowering of the value of the concept of ‘philosophy’ for more than a century. It was against Hume that Kant arose, and rose; it was Locke of whom Schelling said, understandably, ‘je méprise Locke’; in their fight against the English-mechanistic doltification of the world, Hegel and Schopenhauer were of one mind (with Goethe) – these two hostile brother geniuses in philosophy who strove apart toward opposite poles of the German spirit and in the process wronged each other as only brothers can wrong each other.” (Part VIII, 252; Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p. 379).

95 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, 11; Basic Writings of Nietzsche, pp. 476-477.

96 Nietzsche, Human, All-too Human, 141; Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p. 152.

97 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Part V, 201; Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p. 303.


Download 0,7 Mb.
1   ...   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43




Download 0,7 Mb.